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Supervising the Intemational
Financia! System
JOSEPH P. DANIELS

Introduction
As the Group of Eigbt (G8) evolves, the elite club has shown that it is willing
to tackle issues that are domestic in nature yet have an intemational linkage.
That is, domestic issues that share a commonality across member nations or
have considerable extemalities become part of the agenda. Issues of aging
populations and employment levels are examples. On the other hand, the G8
has a]so shown a preference to delegate to international bodies intemational
issues that may affect member nations to varying degrees.
In many cases, the delegation of responsibility is wise. In the case of
infectious diseases, developing an agenda and delegating responsibilities to
the World Health Organization (WHO) is a sound managerial decision.
Delegating agendas and responsibilities to intemational organizations that are
ill-equipped or unable to deal with pressing issues, however, is at best ineffective and perhaps even reckless.
Recent responses of the G8 to contemporary economic problems,
which are rooted in the financia} sector as opposed to the real sector, have been
to ignore, minimize, and delegate to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 1
The outcome is ineffective and reckless policymaking. In the middle of the
financia) meltdowns in Asían and Russia, and with contagian lapping at the
shores of Latin America, a single day's editorials in the Wall Street Joumal
argued the following:
... Argentina is about the only nation where the (lntemational Monetary)
Fund's gotten it right since the current crises began with the Mexican
bailout back in 1994 ... The issue is not sirnply the large amount ofmoney,
but also an IMF record that in any responsible fmancia] institution would
require the frring of senior management... 2
In the same article George Soros made the following remark about
the response of the G7 nations to the crisis:
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The third major factor working for the disintegration of the global capitalist system is the evident inability of the intemational monetary authorities to hold it together. IMF programs do not seems to be working. The
response of the Group of Seven industrialized countries to the Russian
crises was woefully inadequate, and the loss of control quite scary. 3

By not handling the recent financia! crises in a timely or effective
manner, the G8 has demonstrated that, either. by choice or by inability, it is not
an institution of effective global leadership in the areas of deepest importance.
Important issues of fmancial bailouts and coordination of supervision and regulation must be resolved prior to the new millennium.
Section 2 of this chapter examines the dramatic increase of capital
flows to developing economies and the importance of financia} intermediaries in channeling these funds. Section 3 outlines the various risks brought
about by greater integration of capital and money markets. Section 4 presents views on government regulation of domestic financia! systems and considers the capacity of existing international organizations to fulfill this role.
Section 5 outlines the critica} responsibilities of the Group of Seven (G7)
and G8 in light of 1997-98 financia! crises. Section 6 offers a conclusion .

Evolution of Capital Markets
During the Bretton Woods System, capital flows were relatively limited.
Hence, most capital flows and foreign exchange transactions occurred to
finance and facilitate transactions in the real sector. As a result, a typical intemational payments crisis was a slowly developing payments imbalance driven
by transactions in the real sector. Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF
and the World Bank were relatively well equipped to deal with these types of
cnses.
Following the advent of a floating exchange rate system, most of
the industrialized nations began to remove capital restrictions and deregulate
their domestic monetary and financia} markets, beginning with the United
States and Canada in the early 1980s. The daily volume of foreign
exchange transactions mushroomed from approximately $15 billion in
1973 to $1.4 trillion in 1998, a volume that is severa! times larger than the
daily volume of transactions that occur in the real sector. In addition, crossborder transactions of bonds and equities in the United Sates (U .S.)
increased from 9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1980 to 164
percent in 1995 (Daniels and VanHoose, 1999, p. 174).
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Increased Capital Flows to Developing Economies
Arguably more important has been the increased volume of capital tlows among
nations. Indeed, the most striking feature ofthe 1990s, is the increased volume
of capital tlows to the emerging countries. Figure 7.1 illustrates the rise in total
net private capital flows for the emerging economies, distinguishing between net
direct investment tlows and portfolio flows. As shown in the figure, net prívate
capital flows to the emerging economies has risen a dramatic 415%.

Figure 7.1 Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging Economies, 1990-96
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Middle East and Europe
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As learned in the 1994-1995 Mexican financial crisis, it is important
to recognize the proportion of net private capital tlows that are portfolio
investments. Thís tlow of short term capital, often referred to as "hot
money", can reverse direction quickly, leaving a nation's financial sector in
an illiquid positíon. (See Chang and Velasco, 1998, for an excellent revíew
of the Asían liquidity problem.) Figure 7.1 shows that for the emergíng
natíons, the largest proportion of net prívate capital flows was net portfolío
flows until the Mexican financíal críses occurred.
Figure 7.1 also demonstrates that the proportion of net portfolio
flows to total prívate capital flows díffers wídely across the varíous regíons.
For the Middle East and Europe, net portfolio flows account for 42% oftotal
prívate flows, while it is a mere 8o/o for the transitíonal economies. The fact
that portfolio flows can reverse quickly is evident in the Western Hemisphere
region, where net portfolio flows dropped by $68.3 million in 1995 alone,
representing a 112% decline. Net direct foreign investment flows as a percent oftotal net prívate flows range from 58% for the transitional economies
to a scant 7o/o for the Middle East and Europe economies.
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The Importance of Financia! Intermedia/ion
It is important to recognize that the capital flows described above are the savings of one nation's residents being loaned to another nation's residents.
Financia] intermediaries play an extremely important role as they channel
these savings to borrowers and help finance domestic investment. The solvency of a nation's intermediaries is critica] for the stable flow of capital and
continued growth and prosperity.
Unfortunately, history has shown that financia] systems and intermediaries are quite fragile. The IMF estimates that since 1980, 133 of the 181
member nations have experienced banking problems considered to be significant (Lindgren, et al, 1996). According to available estimates, the cost of the
1977 through 1985 crisis in Spain amounted to 17o/o of its output. In the
Nordic countries, the costs of the banking crises that occurred in the late
1980s and early 1990s amounted to 8% of Finland's output, 6% in Sweden
and 4o/o in Norway. The cost of the savings and loan crisis in the United
States totaled at least $200 billion, or 3o/o of U.S. output (Goldstein and
Tumer, 1996).
The banking crises in the developing nations have tended to be much
more severe. It is believed that the costs of the 1980's banking crises in
Argentina equaled one-half ofthe nation's GDP. The Mexican crisis amounted toa loss of 12 to 15% of output. The costs ofthe 1997-98 crises will be
considerable. The 1995 real estate collapse in Japan resulted in the nonperformance of more than $250 billion in bank loans. In South Korea more than
10% of all bank loans were non-performing by 1998. For India and China
the number of non-performing loans are estimated to be nearly 20% of outstanding loans.
As one might suspect, given the increase in international capital
flows, over 354% from 1986-98 (Daniels and VanHoose, 1999), very few
nations' capital investment projects are purely financed by domestic intermediaries. Even investment in the United States that is bank-financed increasingly relies on foreign banks, as the largest U.S. corporations use, on average, the services of foreign banks more than domestic institutions. Given the
heightened level of integration, a nation's system of intermediaries is now
exposed to new sources of risk.

New Sources ofRisk
The growth and globalization of capital markets has brought about a vast
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number of new opportunities for savers and borrowers. It has al so generated
new risks. There are five particular sources of risk examined here; 'hot
money' flows, systemic risk, contagian, increasing sophistication of financia]
instruments, and regulatory arbitrage.
Hot Money Flows

As demonstrated in the previous section, there has been a dramatic increase
in short-term portfolio flows, particularly to the emerging economies. Many
of these emerging nations have financia! and banking sectors that are underdeveloped, not regulated, and not properly supervised. When positive, these
net inflows can put upward pressure on a nation's currency and on domestic
inflation. On the other hand, they also represent a lower cost form of financing (hence lower interest rates) and stimulate a nation's economy.
Portfolio flows can, however, reverse direction at rates that quickly
exhaust the cumulative buildup of years of inflows. In an economy with an
underdeveloped financia! sector, these outflows may result in an illiquid
banking system and put downward pressure on the nation's currency. Under
a fixed exchange rate regime, the government is faced with opposing problems: The banking system needs additionalliquidity while the exchange rate
regime requires higher interest rates. This is the type of problem seen in the
1997-98 financia! crises (see Glick, 1998, for a survey ofthe literature in this
area).
Herstatt Risk

A second aspect is Herstatt Risk or credit risk that spans borders and/or time
zones. In 1974, German banking regulators closed the failed Herstatt bank at
3:30p.m., after the bank had received European foreign exchange payments
but befare it made required payments to U.S. banks. Because U.S. banks did
not receive anticipated payments, they were, in many cases, unable to fulfill
their own obligations. By the time the entire event unwound, U.S. banks had
lost as much as $200 million dollars.
Transmission of Shocks

A third aspect of increased globalization is the transmission of shocks and the
potential of contagian. As financia! markets become more integrated, the
transmission of shocks becomes possible and can even be magnified. Such
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was the case ofthe U.S. stock market crash ofthe 1980s. Because ofintertwined markets, the crash spilled into exchanges across the globe. The recent
East Asian crises shows that currency crises may have the potential for
regional contagian. Empírica] work by Glick and Rose (1998) indicates that
currency crises affect "clusters" of nations through intemational trade chaoneis.

Increased Sophistication of Financia/ Instruments
As the financial markets have evolved, new and highly sophisticated financia] instruments have been introduced. The use of these instruments often
becomes widespread before appropriate domestic regulators and corporate
managers fully understand their risks and benefits. The 1995 collapse of
Barings bank illustrates this point. The same day that Peter Baring had to ask
the Bank ofEngland to intervene, and the day after the trader involved in the
derivatives fiasco, N ick Leeson, faxed in his resignation, Barings was to
announce and award company bonuses, including a bonus to Leeson in the
amount of E450,000. The totallosses to Barings is estimated to be E927 mi Ilion.

Regulatory Arbitrage
A final aspect, one that has not received as much attention in the literature, is
the impact of increased globalization, competition, and technological
advances on bank structure. Regulatory arbitrage, establishing foreign
offices to avoid domestic regulation, has increased dramatically due to technological advances in banking. Globalization and competition has led to
increased merger activity and the creation of "mega" banks. Both activities
undermine the attempts of sovereign govemments to regulate and supervisor
national banking institutions.
The various risks listed above heighten the importance of a sound
payments system and a sound system of banks and financia] intermediaries.
Financial solvency is, therefore, a key policymaking issue and critica] to the
operation and stability of the global economy.

The Regulation and Supervision of Financia( Systems
How should sovereign governments and international organizations respond
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to the risks of increasing financia} integration? It is important to first distinguish between international financia! liberalization and financia} regulation.
Liberalization is the opening up of the financia! market to foreign participants, increasing competition and opportunities for domestic banks.
Regulation is the governing of the financia! sector in order to improve its
operation of financia} intermediation. Obviously, and as evident in the 199798 financia] crises, appropriate regulation and supervision is required for the
domestic financia) system to absorb and channel in an economically efficient
way the inflows and outflows of capital.

Views of Government Intervention
One view of government intervention in the financia} sector is that financia} intermediation is inherently an unstable business whose fortunes rise
and fall with the business cycle and that financia} markets may have inherent imperfections. Hence, government regulation and safety nets are
required to prevent periodic banking collapses.
In line with this view, Von Hagen and Fratianni ( 1998) identify
three main reasons for financia} regulation. The first is that small depositors find it too costly to continuously monitor the activities of intermediaries. Hence, small depositors need protection from the risk of bank failure. The second is that regulation is required to prevent large withdrawals
from one bank which might affect the entire industry, that is, to prevent
contagian. The final reason is to preserve the integrity ofthe payments system. The authors assert that these types of banking regulation involve the
reallocation of risk and therefore wealth among market participants. In a
global setting this reallocation can become quite complexas sovereign governments wish to protect domestic residents over foreign residents.
Another view is that regulation that eliminates competition and the
existence of safety nets creates a moral hazard problem and may actually
be responsible for recent banking crises. This second view has been used
extensively to build a critica! case against the necessity of international
organizations such as the IMF. lt has played particularly well on the floor
ofthe U.S. Congress who delayed approval of a new allocation of funds to
the IMF until October 1998.

Regulation and Supervision: New or Old Institutions?
In spite of recent criticism, there have been a number of well placed initia-
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tives and actions taken in response to the risks described above. Examples
are the Lamfalussy Report, a 1990 Group of Ten (G 1O) initiative that outlined the legal responsibilities of any intermediary undertaking a large volume wire transfer, the Basle Capital Accord for capital adequacy standards,
cross-border banking principies for consolidated supervision, risk management guidelines for derivatives trading, and core principies for effective
banking supervision.
Many of these initiatives resulted from G 7 directives. The Halifax
and Lyon summits, in particular, addressed the global financial situation.
(See the excellent volume by Kenen, 1996, where most of the following
information is taken from.) Directives to the IMF included a request to the
IMF to develop procedures to provide faster access to IMF credit with
strengthened conditionality, to develop standards for data availability, and
to intensify surveillance beyond Article IV policy reviews. The response
was an emergency financing mechanism, the Special Data Dissemination
Standards, and publication of Article IV reviews for those countries wishing the reviews to be public.
The G 1O was asked to double the credit facilities available to the
IMF and to review procedures that might prevent or resolve financial
crises. The G 1O responded with a new arrangement that doubled available
IMF credit and, as a first-step, conducted a survey of market participants
and domestic regulations in numerous countries. Based on the results of
the survey, the G 1O emphasized market based governance and that ca untries should not expect bailouts the "size of Mexico".

Responsibility of the G7 and G8
Through these recent directives, the leaders demonstrated a recognition of
the comparative advantages ofthe supranational organizations and the ability to construct well placed directives. They were not, however, timely nor
were all directives fulfilled. There are a number of pressing issues that the
G7 and G8 must address. (See Sachs, 1998, for a proposed agenda and a
recommendation that the G8 be expanded toa G 16.)

1MF Bailouts
Arguably most important is the problem of IMF bailouts. As is frequently
argued, unlimited IMF bailouts increase the moral hazard of lending and
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borrowing activities. Jeffrey Sachs (1998, p. 24) argues that the IMF
worked "mightily and wrongheadedly" to make the world safe for "naive
25-year-old investment bankers who do not know much about world politics". Bailouts such as that in East Asia should cease.
Recent words of the G8 indicate that nations should not expect
unlimited bailouts. lt appears, however, that the IMF is continuing to
approach problems as it has in the past and, thus IMF actions say otherwise.
lt is vital that the G7 /G8 formulate a coherent and consistent approach to
bailouts of future financia! crises. The G7 /G8 and the IMF must break the
expectations they helped create. lt is disappointing that the strongest statement the leaders could offer at the Birmingham summit was that "it is also
important to ensure that the private sector plays a timely and appropriate
role in crises resolution". 4

IMF Responsibility
The G7 should shoulder the responsibility of actions being taken by the
IMF. In contrast to organizations such as the United Nations, voting shares
at the IMF are based on a weighted average as opposed toa "one nation,
one vote" scheme. The weighted average voting power of the G7 in creases for many important areas. On most issues, the G7 has 4 7% power and
on the most important issues the G7's voting share is 70-80%. Hence, the
G7 can define the broad agenda and block initiatives. In a 1998 testimony
before the U.S. Congressional Joint Economic Committee, Paul Volcker
(Wall Street Journal, 7 May 1998) stated that Congress "should pay Iess
attention to the faceless bureaucrats at the IMF and focus more on where
IMF policy on rescue packages really gets made. Your concerns should be
addressed to Treasury".

IMF/World Bank Capabilities
In the longer-run, the G8 should rethink completely the role and even the
necessity of the IMF and the World Bank. The G8 must first realize that
the IMF is not technically equipped to deal with the types of financial crises
that occur in the post-Bretton Woods era. Due to the increased integration
of capital markets, the current crises have been fast-developing, financia) in
nature, and beyond the capacity of the Fund and other existing international organizations. As an example, the most current IMF Manual For
Country Economists states:
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A country will require IMF assistance when it is having balance of pay-

ments difficulties or, in other words, when the normal inflow of externa)
savings is not sufficient to finance its resource gap, which is defined as
the difference between domestic savings and domestic investment.
Next the G8 must realize that the current approach to Fund conditionality is
counterproductive. Sachs (1998, p. 25), states that:
This process (conditionality) is out of hand. lt has undermined political
legitimacy in dozens of developing countries, especially since the IMF is
often happy to conspire with governments to make end runs around parliaments in the interests of "reform". The contents of IMF programmes
are too flawed to be a standard of good or poor performance. Markets
realize this, so IMF programmes do less and less to rally them.

Supervisory Coordination
Finally, the G8 must further discussions on supervisory coordination.
Primarily an initiative of Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martín, the issue
should be expanded to include regulatory coordination in order to reduce regulatory arbitrage. In contrast to the Martín initiative, however, this should not
lead to a new supranational body composed of governmental agents. It
should be delegated to an agency with the greatest comparative advantage,
perhaps the London Club or the Bank for Intemational Settlements (BIS). It
should also seek input from prívate sector practitioners as in today's financial
environment, operational risk is greater the market risk. Bank management
must therefore be involved.

Conclusion

It has been argued here that the G7, G8, and the summit process has failed to
deal effectively with the most pressing economic issue ofthe day, that is, fastdeveloping liquidity crises of domestic financia} sectors. The G 7 and the G8
leaders have deferred these problems primarily to the IMF which has not the
resources nor the technical ability to deal with such crises. Key agenda items
should in elude the size and availability of bailout funds and the coordination
of financia} supervision and regulation. This is not an agenda for the new
millennium. It is an agenda for today. At the turn of the millennium it may
be much too late to address these issues.
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Notes
1

2
3
4

According to one insider of the annual summits, the Japanese contingent
brought up the impending financial problems in Thailand at the 1997
Denver summit. The other parties were uninterested and consequently the
topic was dropped from discussions.
Soros, G. ( 15 September 1998), "The Crises of Global Capitalism", The
Wa/1 Street Journal, p. A22.
Soros, G. (15 September 1998), "The Crises of Global Capitalism", The
Wa/1 Street Journal, p. A22.
G8 Birmingham Summit Communiqué, 15-17 May 1998.
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